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POLICY BRIEF
COVID-19’s Impacts on the
Labor Market in 2020
Brad J. Hershbein and Harry J. Holzer
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n COVID-19 decimated the U.S.
labor market in the spring of 2020; a
partial recovery in the summer and
early fall left historically marginalized
and economically disadvantaged
groups largely behind, more than in
any previous recession.
n The aggregate recovery stagnated
at the end of the year, masking that
while higher-paid workers continued
to see small gains, lower-paid workers
experienced renewed small losses.
n Blacks and Hispanics have had
slower employment recoveries than
whites, even accounting for differences
in education and occupation.
n States hit harder by COVID earlier
on continue to lag behind in their
employment recovery.
n While state economic restrictions
depress employment temporarily,
the effect quickly fades once they’re
relaxed, but higher mortality rates
persistently reduce employment for
months.
n An equitable recovery will need
accelerated vaccination efforts, greater
economic relief to the unemployed,
and reinvigorated training for workers
needing new jobs.
For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/341.

Imarkets
t is no secret that in the spring of 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted U.S. labor
more severely and more quickly than at any point in living memory. A blizzard

of research papers, newspaper stories, and calls for economic relief have documented
the severe crash in employment in the spring of 2020, and the disproportionate burden
borne by workers in leisure and accommodation, workers of color, and workers unable
to do their jobs remotely. Far less is known, however, about how employment trajectories
have played out for diferent groups over the rest of 2020, as a nascent recovery frst
gathered steam and then stalled, and how these patterns varied across states that difered
in the timing and severity of their outbreaks and economic restrictions.
In a related paper, we draw on publicly available data on detailed employment
measures, COVID case rates and mortality, and state restriction policies to shed light on
how labor markets have evolved since the pandemic began, capturing trends through
the end of 2020. We fnd that the overall jobs recovery fatlined in October, as caseloads
and mortality rose sharply, but that this aggregate pause obscured a continuation of slow
gains among higher-paid workers and a second, if much milder, drop among lowerpaid workers. We also confrm that Blacks and Hispanics not only had larger initial
employment losses in the spring, but that their employment recoveries lagged over the
summer and early fall. Even when we control for diferences in education and type of
occupation, these racial gaps persist, although by year’s end there was convergence for
Blacks even as the gap for Hispanics began to grow again. Permanent job loss has also
been higher among these groups.
In addition to these disparities by race, we also fnd large and persistent disparities in
employment trends across states. Grouping states into three categories based on when
their caseloads frst peaked, we document that employment recoveries have lagged
among states that had the earliest outbreaks, and that the share of their populations with
permanent job loss has increased the most. Delving into the reasons for this dispersion,
we show that while economic restrictions hurt employment when they are in place,
their negative impact quickly fades once they are relaxed. Rather, elevated mortality
rates depress employment not only contemporaneously but for months aferward, most
likely because a greater number of deaths is a highly visible and persistent signal for the
dangers of engaging in economic activity that drives both jobs and the risk of infection.
Unfortunately, the rise in mortality rates that occurred at the end of 2020 will likely
create headwinds for continued employment recovery in 2021.
To ofset these headwinds and increase the chances that the recovery is broad and
inclusive, we propose a series of policies to provide fnancial assistance to the workers hit
hardest by the pandemic and to help reskill workers whose jobs are unlikely to return.
However, any robust recovery will require eforts to control the spread of the virus in the
immediate future, including accelerated vaccination, more widespread and inexpensive
testing, and increased incentives for mask wearing and physical distancing.
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In addition to the
approximately 10 million
more people without a
job, as of December 2020
another 2 million are
employed but working
fewer hours than before
the pandemic.

2020 Labor Market Trends

Figure 1 presents three indicators of aggregate employment over the course of 2020.
Te red line with circles shows the employment rate of people aged 18–64—the share
of these people with jobs—although we have adjusted this number slightly to exclude
individuals who reported being absent from work for unspecifed reasons. (Te U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics believes many of this latter group should have been classifed as
unemployed instead.) Starting above 75 percent prior to the pandemic, the employment
rate dips in March before plummeting over 13 percentage points in April, gradually
recovering to 71 percent by October and budging little over the next two months. Nearly
10 million fewer Americans had a job in December than in February 2020.
However, this doesn’t capture the full scope of the employment loss, as many workers
have kept their jobs but had their hours reduced involuntarily. Tus, the blue line
with squares presents a modifed employment rate that excludes individuals who are
involuntarily part time. Te gap between this measure of employment and the frst one is
1.5 percentage points in January and February, but it widens substantially by April to 4.7
percentage points, and even in December is still 2.6 percentage points. Tis means that,
in addition to the approximately 10 million fewer people without a job, another 2 million
are employed but working fewer hours than before the pandemic. Finally, the dashed
black line shows the total number of hours worked per week across all Americans. Tis
metric has fallen from 5.6 billion in early 2020 to 5.15 billion as of December, a decline
of 8.4 percent, about the same percentage decline as the modifed employment rate,
suggesting that this employment rate is a good proxy for the strength of the labor market.

The Rising Inequality Gap

Tis overall recovery, anemic as it is, has not been felt equally by all workers. Te
two panels in Figure 2 break out trends by occupational wage quartile. Each quartile
represents a fourth of workers based on the average hourly wage in their occupation,
with 1 being the lowest and 4 being the highest. Panel A shows the modifed employment
Figure 1 Labor Market Indicators Over 2020
80%

5.75

Employment rate (left axis)

5.50

75%

Total weekly hours (billions, right axis)
70%

5.25
5.00
4.75

65%

4.50
60%

Adjusted employment rate (left axis)
55%

Jan

Mar

May

Jul

Sep

Nov

4.25
4.00

NOTE: The employment rate is the share of non-institutionalized civilians aged 18–64 who report being
employed, except for those who report being absent from work for unspecifed reasons (many of whom are
believed by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to have been misclassifed and are actually unemployed). The
modifed employment rate excludes individuals who report being employed part-time involuntarily. Total weekly
hours is the sum of all hours worked by people during the reference week of the survey.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; authors’ calculations.

2

POLICY BRIEF | FEBRUARY 2021

Te modifed employment
rate of the lowest wage
quartile plummeted by an
astonishing 35 percentage
points between February
and April.
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rate, as in Figure 1. Although lower wage quartiles have always had lower employment
rates, the gap surged afer the pandemic began. Te modifed employment rate of the
frst wage quartile plummeted by an astonishing 35 percentage points between February
and April, before rebounding about two-thirds of the way back by October. Workers in
higher wage quartiles sufered much smaller losses, with those in the top quartile down
only 2 percentage points from the beginning of 2020 by year’s end, and those in the
Figure 2 The Bottom Wage Quartile Has Had a Much Weaker Recovery Than the
Top Quartile
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NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. The permanent job loser share
is the share of the population (not just the unemployed) who report having lost a job and do not expect to be
recalled. The (hourly) wage quartiles are based on detailed occupation from Occupational Employment Statistics
and are population weighted; Q1 thus represents the bottom quarter of workers in terms of hourly pay, while Q4
represents the top quarter.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; Occupational Employment Statistics; authors’ calculations.
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Not only have Blacks
and Hispanics had larger
employment losses and
slower recoveries, these
disparities cannot be
explained by educational
and occupational
diferences.

third quartile down 6 percentage points. While modifed employment rates continued
to rise slightly between November and December for the top two wage quartiles, they
reversed course and fell slightly for the bottom two quartiles. Tese losses occurred
simultaneously with rising COVID caseloads and mortality and renewed economic
restrictions, particularly in the hospitality and leisure sector, which has many low-paying
occupations.
Panel B in Figure 2 examines the share of the population who report sufering
permanent job loss (that is, they lost a job and do not consider themselves on temporary
layof). Research has found that such long-term job separation predicts lower earnings
and higher health risks even decades later (Ruhm 1991; Eliason and Storrie 2006; Sullivan
and Von Wachter 2009). In winter 2020, these shares clustered around half a percent for
all wage quartiles. Tey rose sharply and diverged, particularly over the summer and fall,
with the share peaking at 3.2 percent in October for the bottom quartile. Te slight dips
seen in December are not necessarily good news—because modifed employment rates
also fell for the bottom quartiles (panel A), it’s likely that workers in the bottom quartile
were leaving the labor force entirely rather than fnding a new job.

Recovery Lags for Black and Hispanic Workers

Te recovery in the modifed employment rate has also varied considerably by race
and ethnicity. Te solid red and blue lines in Figure 3 show the change in the employment
rate, in percentage points, for Blacks and Hispanics since January 2020. Hispanics
initially fare the worst, but Blacks also sufer greater initial losses than other racial
groups (solid gray line). Hispanics have also had a faster recovery, at least into the fall.
By December, racial gaps had narrowed, especially for Blacks, although there was some
slippage for Hispanics.
Some of these racial gaps may be due to education and occupational diferences. Tus,
in the dashed lines, we statistically control for these diferences. Tis reduces the gap
Figure 3 Blacks and Hispanics Have Experienced Slower Employment Rate
Recoveries, Even after Adjusting for Education and Occupation
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NOTE: See note to Figure 1 for the defnition of the modifed employment rate. Light, solid lines show the
change, in percentage points, of the modifed employment rate since January 2020 for each racial group. The
darker, dashed lines control for worker education and occupational wage quartile.
SOURCE: Current Population Survey; Occupational Employment Statistics; authors’ calculations.
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By December, an
additional 100 total
deaths per 100,000 people
in a state reduces the
expected employment rate
by 3 percentage points.
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substantially between Blacks and everyone else in the spring and early summer, but plays
a somewhat smaller role aferward. Tese adjustments make less of a diference for the
gap with Hispanics. Tus, not only have Blacks and Hispanics had larger employment
losses and slower recoveries, the bulk of these disparities—especially for Hispanics—
cannot be explained by educational and occupational diferences.

The Role of COVID Mortality and Economic Restrictions

Employment rate losses and recoveries also difer across states. We fnd, for example,
that states that had initial COVID-19 caseload peaks in the spring of 2020—the wellknown New York and New Jersey, but also Minnesota, Virginia, and Colorado—had
deeper declines and less robust recoveries than states that reached their frst caseload
peak only in the fall, such as New Hampshire, Wisconsin, and Oregon. A key question
is how COVID caseload and mortality rates, as well as state restrictions on economic
activity—including stay-at-home orders and bans on indoor dining, among others—
have afected employment. Using regression analysis, we fnd that current case rates are
positively associated with employment, while current mortality rates and the severity of
current economic restrictions reduce employment rates. Tis likely refects the short-run
trade-of between heightened economic activity and greater virus transmission when
there are fewer restrictions.
However, we also fnd that there are no lingering efects of economic restrictions; once
these are relaxed, the employment rate bounces back. On the other hand, we do fnd an
accumulating impact of COVID mortality (but not caseloads) on employment rates. By
December, a state with 100 more total deaths per 100,000 people—about the diference
between the 90th percentile (Rhode Island; 131.8 deaths per 100,000 people) and the 10th
percentile (Utah; 28.6 deaths per 100,000)—would be expected to have an employment
rate 3 percentage points lower, everything else equal. Te surge in mortality rates that
occurred nationwide in November 2020 through January 2021 thus could pose a looming
threat to continued economic recovery in 2021.

Conclusion

Te labor market recovery from the COVID-19 recession was brief and uneven in
2020, leaving behind workers disadvantaged by race, ethnicity, and economic status.
As cases ebb and fow around the country, states that have sufered—or will sufer—
numerous COVID deaths may experience a slower recovery through 2021. An equitable
and broad economic recovery will need a rapid and comprehensive vaccine rollout,
but we argue in the paper for several additional policies to spur employment. Tese
should include fscal relief for state and local governments to stave of further cuts, wage
insurance programs for those who struggle to fnd new jobs, and enhanced funding for
sectoral training and community college education for industries and occupations that
will continue to grow, such as construction, health care, and IT.
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